The following is the report that I delivered to the House on S.169, which addresses procedures related to firearms and establishes a 24-hour waiting period for the purchase of handguns.

*********

S.169 amends certain provisions of last year’s Act 94 related to large capacity ammunition feeding devices, which I will refer to as large capacity magazines, and background checks.  It also clarifies the implementation of the extreme risk protection orders in last year’s Act 97. Finally, it creates a 24-hour waiting period for the purchase of handguns.

I will first discuss the waiting period and then turn to the other provisions of the bill.

The presence of a firearm dangerously compounds the risk of impulsive acts of violence, especially suicide.  Waiting periods create an important cooling off window for gun purchasers to reconsider their intentions, which can lead to a change of heart and a saved life.  In addition, waiting periods provide additional time for the completion of a thorough background check.

S.169 would establish a 24-hour waiting period for the purchase of handguns. In urging this body to concur with the Senate bill, I will discuss five rationales for supporting this bill: the stories of Vermonters, expert testimony, data, logic, and compromise.

By stories, I mean the real-life accounts of family, friends, and neighbors lost to firearm violence. In December Andrew Black committed suicide in Essex with a handgun that he had purchased four hours earlier. Rob Black explained to the House Judiciary Committee that his son had shown no signs of depression.  A breakup with his girlfriend triggered the impulsive act of purchasing a handgun and, shortly after, using it to end his life. A waiting period could have interrupted this chain of events. Others testified to the traumatic effect of suicide on those who knew the victim and live with the doubt and questions as to what they could have done differently to help their friend or family member avoid that fate.

As for expert testimony, the Judiciary Committee heard from a specialist in pediatric critical care who is also a member of the Community Violence Prevention Task Force. She testified that many suicide attempts occur with little planning during a short-term crisis and that those who attempt suicide impulsively are more likely to choose a violent method.  Studies confirm that most suicide survivors contemplated their actions for only a brief period of time – often less than 24 hours – before making a suicide attempt.

Firearms are the most lethal means of suicide, she explained, with over 85% of firearm suicide attempts resulting in death. This fact is especially important because almost all people who survive a suicide attempt go on to live out their lives and do not subsequently die by suicide.  Contrary to common belief, the vast majority of suicide survivors recover and do not remain suicidal.

Based on this witness’s experience and her understanding of the scientific studies, she concluded that restrictions on highly lethal means would lead to fewer suicide deaths. A waiting period for purchasing handguns is such a restriction. National and State physician organizations support this conclusion.  The American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Physicians, the American Medical Association, the Vermont Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the Vermont Medical Society all support the passage of a waiting period.

In addition to helping prevent suicides, this waiting period may also help prevent homicides.  A representative of the Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence testified that firearms are the most frequently-used weapons in domestic homicides and that over half of all homicides in Vermont are domestic violence-related. A cooling off period can help prevent impulsive violence in domestic disputes.

Some argue that victims in domestic abuse situations need handguns immediately for selfdefense.  But handguns are not a panacea in those situations.  The witness from the Network explained that firearms do not increase victim safety and are rarely used in self-defense by victims of domestic violence – for every one time a woman used a handgun to kill someone in self-defense, 83 women were murdered with a firearm by their partner.  She concluded that S.169 would reduce the likelihood of these impulsive acts of violence.

Representatives of the Attorney General’s Office and of the Department of State’s Attorneys and Sheriffs testified, supporting the bill as a positive step for public safety.  They also noted that having a waiting period for handgun purchases would help in combatting the drug trade.  Currently, traffickers bring drugs into Vermont and exchange them for handguns, some that are purchased by Vermont residents near the time of the transaction. The waiting period would be an obstacle to such a deal.  It would make Vermont less attractive to those trading drugs for guns.

Data also supports S.169.  Studies published in respected scientific journals support the conclusion that a waiting period will reduce firearm violence. A 2015 study in the American Journal of Public Health published research showing that states with waiting period laws had 51% fewer firearm suicides and a 27% lower overall suicide rate than states without such laws. When South Dakota repealed its 48-hour waiting period for handgun purchases in 2009, overall suicides the following year increased by 7.6% compared with a 3.3% increase for the United States in general.

Another Study from 2017 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science concluded that a cooling off period significantly reduces the incidence of gun violence.  The authors estimated that waiting periods on handguns reduce gun homicides by roughly 17% and gun suicides by 7 to 11%.

In the end, however, it is the logic of a waiting period that provides the strongest rationale for the passage of S.169.  Lethal harm to oneself or another can occur when an impulsive act is combined with accessibility to a lethal weapon.  A waiting period provides time to cool off, to let the heat of the moment pass, to distance impulsivity from the ability to acquire a handgun.

I’ve talked about stories, expert testimony, data, and logic.  Another reason to support S.169 is that it reflects a compromise between proponents and opponents of firearm restrictions. The bill eases a number of restrictions on the transfer and use of large capacity magazines. Under current law, individuals may not transfer large capacity magazines in Vermont.  S.169 provides that individuals who own large capacity magazines may transfer them to immediate family members in a will.

In addition, last year’s law allowed large capacity magazines to be transported into Vermont for use in shooting competitions.  But under current law, that authority will sunset in June of this year.  S.169 would allow the continuation of the transport of these devices for organized shooting competitions. Without the provisions in S.169, such shooting competitions in Vermont would effectively come to an end.

Furthermore, the bill broadens the definition of immediate family members who do not need to obtain a background check for private sales or transfers between immediate family members.  In short, these provisions reduce certain restrictions on firearm owners.

The terms of the waiting period itself also represent a compromise.  Proponents of a waiting period urged the legislature to have a longer waiting period – either 48 or 72 hours.  They also wanted the waiting period to extend to all firearms. A 24-hour period for handguns is a compromise that reduces the burden of the waiting period on gun shows while also providing the important interruption of impulsive purchases and impulsive intent to harm oneself or others.

Having the waiting period extend to handguns only will still provide significant benefits.  According to the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, between 1993 and 2011, handguns were used in from 70 to 84 percent of firearm-related crimes. A study of firearm fatalities conducted by Vermont Public Radio found that handguns are used in 2/3 of firearm suicides in Vermont.

Section by Section Summary

1. 169 makes several amendments related to firearms procedures.

Section 1 of the bill deals with large capacity magazines.  Last year, the General Assembly passed Act 94, found at 13 VSA § 4021, which generally prohibits the possession of large capacity magazines – no more than 10 rounds for long guns and no more than 15 rounds for handguns.  There were a number of exceptions to this general prohibition, and Section 1 of this bill concerns those exceptions.

First, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides that a Vermont resident who lawfully possesses a large capacity magazines may transfer it from one immediate family member to another immediate family member by a lawfully executed will. As provided in Section 2 of the bill described below, the definition of immediate family member is expanded.

Second, in subdivision (d)(1)(B), the prohibition on possession of large capacity magazines does not apply if the device is transferred to or possessed by a Vermont or federal law enforcement officer for legitimate law enforcement purposes. However, law enforcement officers from other states were omitted, so S.169 includes them here.  This subdivision provides that the prohibition does not apply to a large capacity magazines possessed by an out-of-state law enforcement officer who is called into this State to assist a Vermont officer for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

Act 94 also included an exception to the magazine ban for devices transported into Vermont by a resident of another state for a shooting competition. However, this exception was sunsetted, so it expires on July 1, 2019.  S.169 makes three changes to this exception: (1) First, the language is changed slightly from an “established” shooting competition to an “organized” shooting competition, which the sportsmen’s groups indicated more accurately describes the events; (2) Second, the exception is expanded to include Vermonters as well as out of state residents, so Vermonters can possess and use large capacity magazines at the competitions so long as the device was grandfathered in by being lawfully possessed on or before October 1, 2018; (3) and Third, which you have to turn to Section 6 at the end of the bill to see, the sunset on the shooting competition is repealed, which means that possession and use of the magazines at shooting competitions will continue to be permitted in the future.

Section 2 of the bill addresses the background check requirement for firearms purchases, which was also established in Act 94 last year.  Under that provision, background checks were generally required for all firearms transfers, though again there were a number of exceptions.  One of those exceptions applied to transfers between immediate family members.  Section 2 of the bill expands the list of immediate family members to include a parent-in-law, a sibling-in-law, aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew.  As a result, transfers between additional family members can be made without needing a background check.

Section 3 of the bill establishes the new waiting period requirement for hand gun transfers. Under this section, a handgun cannot be transferred until 24 hours after completion of the background check required by federal or state law.

In addition to providing a cooling off period, this waiting period addresses a gap in the law, known as “default proceed” or the Charleston Loophole.  Federal law allows a dealer to deliver a gun to a purchaser as soon as a background check is completed, which usually takes only a few minutes.  Sometimes, however, a background check may not be instantly completed.  In such a situation, after three business days have passed, the dealer may provide the firearm to the purchaser, even if a background check is incomplete.  Each year over 3000 ineligible persons receive firearms through this default provision nationwide.  Dylann Roof was one individual who obtained a firearm without a completed background check, which would have revealed that he was a prohibited person, not allowed to obtain a firearm.  He used that firearm to kill nine people at Emanuel AME Church in Charleston.

Individuals should not be able to skirt the background check by taking advantage of this gap in the law.  S.169 would close this gap.  The 24-hour waiting period would commence upon completion of the background check, including in those instances when law enforcement needs additional time to do its work, such as, for example, determining if the purchaser is subject to a domestic violence restraining order.

Under subsection (c), the waiting period does not apply to a transfer that does not require a background check.  This means that a hand gun may be transferred without a waiting period if one of the exceptions to the background check requirement applies, such as transfers between immediate family members and law enforcement officers, transfers in emergency situations, or temporary loans.

Sections 4 and 5 of the bill concern Vermont’s extreme risk protection order statute that was passed in Act 97 last year. Act 97 established a procedure for a State’s Attorney or the Attorney General to obtain a court order, called an Extreme Risk Protection Order (known as an ERPO).  Such an order temporarily prohibits a person from possessing a dangerous weapon if the court finds that the person’s possession of the weapon poses an extreme risk of harm to the person or to other people. It came to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s attention, however, that some health care providers who would like to provide relevant information to law enforcement officers about potentially dangerous people are unsure if they can do so without violating the privacy provisions of HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.

When the Senate Judiciary Committee reviewed this issue, it discovered that HIPAA already includes a relevant exception.  Health care providers can disclose information when the provider believes in good faith that disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public. This imminent threat standard is essentially the same as the extreme risk standard that we have in the ERPO law.  Section 4 makes that connection explicit by clarifying that an imminent threat includes circumstances when the health care provider reasonably believes that the patient poses an extreme risk of causing harm to himself or herself or another person by purchasing, possessing, or receiving a dangerous weapon.  Having this language gives health care providers the confidence to let law enforcement officers know when an extreme risk exists.

Section 5 is an attempt to gather information on the use of ERPOs in Vermont. It requires the Court Administrator, with the assistance of the Agency of Human Services, to report data on ERPO use annually to the Senate and House Committees on Judiciary.  The report will include the number of petitions filed and the number of orders issued, the county where the petition was filed, and follow-up information describing whether the order was renewed or terminated and whether the subject of the order was charged with violating it. In addition, the Agency of Human Services is required to include in the reports an analysis of the impact of extreme risk prevention orders on Vermont suicide rates.

As I mentioned earlier, Section 6 repeals the sunset for use of large capacity magazines in organized shooting competitions.

Section 7 provides that the bill takes effect on passage.

We heard from numerous witnesses.  We also held a  public hearing where we heard from 61  community members.

The vote in committee was 7-4-0.

 

This is the report that I delivered on the House Floor regarding S.37.

S.37 has two components.  First, it would establish the criteria under which people wrongfully exposed to toxic substances could sue to have the polluter pay for monitoring their medical condition.  Second, it expands the type of entities that can be held liable for the cost of cleaning up hazardous materials that are released into the environment.  I will first address medical monitoring.

During the winter of 2016, the State of Vermont discovered widespread contamination of private drinking water supplies with perfluorooctanoic [Per fluro octa no ick] acid (PFOA) in Bennington County. Perfluorinated compounds such as PFOA are manufactured chemicals used to make a variety of commercial and household products. PFOA does not easily break down and persists in the environment for decades, particularly in water. Studies have shown a correlation between levels of PFOA in the blood and a variety of illnesses including high blood pressure, decreased birth weight, some immune system effects, thyroid disease, kidney cancer, and testicular cancer.

PFOA has been largely unregulated for decades under federal and Vermont law. But it is just one example of chemicals that pose risks to human health and the environment.  There are approximately 85,000 chemicals on the federal Chemical Substance Inventory and thousands of chemicals used that are not even on a list of toxic substances.  Only about 200 of these chemicals have had robust health and safety testing by the federal Environmental Protection Agency.

Recognizing the need to protect Vermonters from the impact of toxic chemicals, the Vermont General Assembly enacted Act 154 in 2016. The law directed the Agency of Natural Resources to convene a working group to address the use and regulation of toxic chemicals.  Among other tasks, the working group was to recommend how to fill gaps in Vermont laws in order to better protect Vermonters from exposure to harmful chemicals, and to help them if they are impacted by toxic contamination.

In January 2017, the working group published its final report.  It recommended, in part, that the legislature should authorize individuals to recover the expense of medical monitoring for diseases when exposed to toxic substances due to another’s wrongful conduct.  S.37 is the response to this recommendation.

Medical monitoring is a program designed by experts in the field of public health and medicine.  It includes screening and ongoing observation to detect the symptoms of latent diseases linked to exposure to a toxic substance.  Monitoring allows for the earliest detection and treatment of these latent diseases.  Similar to early detection efforts such as mammograms and colonoscopies, this program ensures the best possible health outcomes at the least cost. It ensures that those harmed are screened and referred for medical care at the earliest possible time when effective treatment can improve outcomes.

S.37 ensures that the cost of medical monitoring is not borne by the general public or the harmed individuals, as currently is the case. Rather, that cost is paid by the industrial entity that caused the need for incurring those health costs.

It will not be easy for individuals to prove that they are entitled to the remedy of medical monitoring.  Individuals will have to convince a judge or jury that a company wrongfully exposed them to a known toxic substance; that the exposure to the toxic chemical increases their risk of developing a latent disease; that the exposure was at a level that could credibly trigger the need for medical monitoring; and that there are diagnostic tests that can detect the latent disease. While it sets a high bar of proof, the bill would provide a path for Vermonters to receive a remedy that is not currently available under Vermont law.

In short, the bill provides that those responsible for wrongfully exposing Vermonters to toxic substances known to cause diseases will bear the costs of monitoring for those diseases.

Section-by-section explanation

Section 1. Adds a new chapter to Title 12—12 V.S.A. chapter 219 – Medical Monitoring

12 V.S.A. § 7201 provides relevant definitions for the Chapter.  I will come back to the pertinent definitions as I explain the next section of the bill, which sets forth the test for obtaining Medical Monitoring relief for Exposure to Toxic Substances

• 12 V.S.A. § 7202(a) authorizes a cause of action for medical monitoring by a person, without a present injury, against the owner or operator of a large facility from which a toxic substance is released if all of the following are demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence:

Some of the terms in this provision require further explanation.

First, only people without a present injury can sue for medical monitoring under S.37.  Those who have already developed a disease from exposure to a toxic substance are already able to sue for harm caused to them, including medical monitoring costs.

Second, not all facilities are included in the scope of S.37.  It must be a Large Facility, first of all.

• Section 7201 defines large facility as a facility:
• where an activity with certain Standard Industrial Classification codes (SIC codes) is conducted or was conducted. The included SIC codes cover mining, manufacturing, and transportation businesses. The classification codes do not include agriculture or the health care industry.
• A facility is also defined as “large” where 10 or more full-time employees have been employed at any one time; or that is owned or operated by a person who, when all facilities or establishments the person owns or controls are aggregated, has employed 500 employees at any one time.
• The House version of this section narrows the definition of “large facility.”In the Senate version, anyfacility with 10 or more full-time employees would be subject to the law.Under the House version, those facilities must also fall under one of the SIC codes.
• Third, section 7201 defines toxic substance as any substance, mixture, or compound that may cause personal injury or disease to humans through ingestion, inhalation, or absorption through any body surface and that:
• Is listed on EPA’s list of hazardous substances recognized by federal laws [CERCLA, RCRA, EPCRA, CAA lists];
• Is a hazardous material or hazardous waste under State law;
• Has been determined by National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health or EPA testing to pose acute or chronic health hazards;
• Is the subject of a public health advisory from the Vermont Department of Health; or
• exposure to the substance is shown by expert testimony to increase the risk of developing a latent disease.
  • I will note here that other states have established the remedy of medical monitoring through court-made law. The courts generally do not define what a toxic substance is.  Rather, they usually refer to a “proven hazardous substance,” without explaining how the substance is proven to be hazardous.  Accordingly, in these states there is no clarity or limits surrounding what is considered a toxic substance.  37 takes a different approach by providing a definition of toxic substances.
• Properly and lawfully applied pesticides and ammunition and components thereof are not toxic substances for the purposes of S.37.

Turning back to the test for proving the entitlement to medical monitoring, the person must prove all of the following four elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

• The first element provides that the person was exposed to the toxic substance as a result of tortious conduct by the owner or operators of the large facility or persons under their control;
  • Tortious conduct includes the common law torts of negligence, trespass, nuisance, product liability, or common law liability for ultra-hazardous activity. Tortious conduct is a standard used in other states.  But S.37 limits the scope of what is to be considered tortious conduct by defining the universe of torts.  Other states do not do this and courts have expanded the cause of action beyond the traditional torts.  37 is limiting in the scope of action when compared to some other jurisdictions.
• The second element of the test provides that as a proximate result of the exposure, the exposed person has a greater risk of contracting a latent disease;
  • Disease is defined in 7201 as any disease, illness, ailment, or adverse physiological or chemical change linked to exposure to a toxic substance.
• The third element of the test provides that diagnostic testing is reasonably necessary. Testing is reasonably necessary if a physician would prescribe testing based on the fact that the increased risk of contracting the disease due to the exposure makes it reasonably necessary to undergo diagnostic testing that is different from what would normally be prescribed in the absence of exposure. This must be shown by expert testimony.
  • Breaking this provision down, the issues are:
    • Whether the increased risk is sufficient to make diagnostic testing reasonably necessary and
    • Whether the diagnostic testing would be prescribed in the absence of exposure to the toxic substance.
  • The final element of the test provides that medical tests or procedures exist to detect the latent disease.

I will reiterate here that proving these elements would be very difficult and would be developed through expert testimony.

• Subsection (b) provides that if medical monitoring damages are awarded, a court shall order the liable entity to pay the award to a court-supervised medical monitoring program administered by a health official with expertise in toxic exposure or the relevant latent disease.
• Subsection (c) provides that upon an award of medical monitoring damages, the court shall also award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
• Subsection (d) provides that nothing in the new chapter authorizing medical monitoring damages precludes the pursuit of any other civil or injunctive remedy available under statute or common law. Except that this law provides the exclusive medical monitoring remedy for individuals without a present injury.
• Subsection (e) clarifies that the exclusive remedy for employees injured at work is through workers compensation. However, if the employee is wrongfully exposed to a toxic substance and has no present injury, the employee may seek a remedy under the procedures created in S.37.

Section 2 – Session law

• The right of a person to bring a cause of action for medical monitoring shall apply retroactively to an exposure to a toxic substance that was discovered by the person in the six years prior to July 1, 2019. The six-year period is consistent with the statute of limitations for civil actions where there is no personal injury.  12 VSA 511.

That concludes the section-by-section analysis of the medical monitoring component of the bill.

Courts in 16 states have recognized a medical monitoring cause of action or remedy. Each state court has created its own test based on the facts and circumstances in the case before it. There is not one test for medical monitoring. The test for medical monitoring in S.37 is not more lenient for people seeking relief than the tests in states providing court-created remedies for medical monitoring.

Indeed, in some respects S.37 creates a right to sue that is narrower than that provided in other states.  The bill limits the cause of action to releases from a subset of large facilities, a limitation not recognized in any other states. Unlike other states, the bill defines disease and defines toxic substance.  Finally, no states include the exemptions that S.37 contains. In this respect, S.37 provides more clarity than tests in other states that have been developed in judicial opinions.  This is one of the advantages of addressing this issue legislatively rather than through the courts.  By enacting S.37, we are able to define these terms and place limits on the applicability of this cause of action based on the broader policy that serves Vermonters best.

Several policy considerations support enacting a medical monitoring cause of action:

First, there is an important public health interest in fostering access to medical testing for individuals whose wrongful exposure to toxic chemicals creates an enhanced risk of disease, particularly in light of the value of early diagnosis and treatment. The availability of medical monitoring may prevent or decrease the severity of future illness and reduce the costs for everyone involved. The early detection of latent diseases may improve the prospects for cure, treatment, prolongation of life and minimization of pain and disability.

Second, there is a deterrence value in recognizing medical monitoring claims – allowing plaintiffs to recover the cost of this care deters irresponsible discharge of toxic chemicals.

Third, standards of fairness and justice are better served by allowing recovery of medical monitoring costs. It would be inequitable for individuals wrongfully exposed to dangerous toxins to have to pay the expense of medical monitoring through no fault of their own.

****************

I will now turn to the second component of this bill. It holds entities liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous materials they released into the environment.

Section 3 of S.37 amends section 6615 of Title 10, which is part of Vermont’s Waste Management Act and in many respects parallels the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

One of the purposes of the Vermont Waste Management Act is to make generators of waste pay for disposal costs that reflect the real costs to society of waste management and disposal. [10 V.S.A. 6601]

Section 6615 protects public health and the environment by facilitating the cleanup of hazardous-waste sites.  It ensures that costs of that cleanup are not borne by the State or tax payers.

6615 holds certain people financially responsible for the release of hazardous waste.  They are responsible for the costs of investigating, responding to, and remediating the harm from a release of hazardous materials. The responsible entities under current law are the owner, operator, transporters, or arrangers.  An “arranger” is anyone, who by contract or other agreement arranged for the disposal or transport of the hazardous material.

Currently an owner, operator, transporter, or arranger are the entities that can be responsible for cleanup costs even if they had no knowledge of the hazardous nature of the material used or transported.  In these situations, the manufacturer of the substance escapes all liability to the State. Instead, the responsible entities must sue the manufacturer to contribute towards the cost of remediation, thereby requiring additional litigation.

Language proposed by the Agency of Natural Resources and the Administration seeks to eliminate this inequity.  It does so by holding a manufacturer to the same strict, joint, and several liability standard the rest of the responsible entities are held to when the manufacturer knew of the risk of the material and failed to adequately warn the user.

Imposing liability on the manufacturer makes sense in the same way allowing claims for medical monitoring makes sense. On one hand, there is the manufacturer of the hazardous waste who knew of the risks and failed to warn.  On the other, there is the owner, operator, transporter or arranger who knew nothing of the risk and managed the material as if it did not pose a risk. Clearly the manufacturer should be responsible for the costs of the remediation in that situation.

6615 was enacted to protect the public and ensure that the harm to the environment was mitigated as soon as practicable and that the entities that caused or contributed to the release are held liable for the costs.  S.37 seeks to bring further equity to 6615 by allowing the State to more effectively litigate against manufacturers who allowed hazardous materials into commerce without sufficiently notifying the public or others in the supply chain of the potential harm.

Section-by-Section

Sec. 3 amends 10 V.S.A. § 6615

• Section 6615(a) clarifies the liability that entities have for abating a release of hazardous materials and for the costs of investigation, removal, and remedial actions incurred by the State that are necessary to protect the public health or the environment.
• Section 6615(a)(5) adds a manufacturer of a commercially available hazardous material to the list of entities potentially liable for a release.
• A manufacturer would be liable if: 1) it manufactured a hazardous material for commercial sale and knew or should have known the material presented a threat of harm to health or the environment; and 2) the material was released to the environment.
• The bill would allow the State to bring the action. It does not create a strict liability cause of action in a private lawsuit for an injury to a person.
• Subsection (d)(5) provides that a manufacturer would not be liable if it demonstrated that it provided adequate warning of the harm posed by the hazardous material that was known or should have been known at the time the material was manufactured.
• Subsection (i) provides that a liable manufacturer cannot seek contribution (payment) from other potentially liable entities. If the manufacturer knew of the harm and sold it without adequate warning, the liability should not be on the innocent entity that purchased the product.

Section 4 – Application of Liability

• A manufacturer’s liability under 6615 would apply retroactively to releases occurring before the act’s effective date.
• Generally, liability for hazardous materials release applies retroactively for any release and all classes of liable persons.

Section 5 – Effective date – July 1, 2019

The Committee vote was 10-0-1.